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A. 
APPELLANT'S DISPUTATION, "CORRECTION" AND REBUTTAL 
OF STATE-MISCHARACTERIZED "FACTS" 
Contrary to the State's assertion [p. iii of BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE] (of "no prior appeals" paraphrased)], the 
Defendant's underlying criminal conviction was appealed to 
and decided by the Utah Court of Appeals in 2008. State vs 
Garcia, 2009 UT App 384, (unpublished memorandum decision), 
24 December 2009. See RECORD at 108-112. 
B. Contrary to the State's assertion [page 5, line 7 of 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE (of Defendant's "conviction on a plea of 
guilty")], the Defendant was actually tried and convicted 
following a one-day jury trial. See RECORD at 81: JURY 
VERDICT document. 
C. The State engages in a misleading "play on words" in 
its sentence [page 5, lines 12-13] that 
"At no time during the criminal proceedings did 
defendant challenge the restitution amount listed 
in the [pre-sentence] report." 
Bracketed word "pre-sentence II added for clarity. The phrase 
"restitution amount" is intentionally misleading, for the 
simple reason that the May 2008 pre-sentence report simply 
did not "recommend" any "restitution". The report 
acknowledged the State agency's (Utah Office of Crime Victim 
Restitution) claim to have paid $7,000 for "funeral 
expenses 11 ; arguably, the statement- - - i.e. agency's assertion 
that $7,000 was paid (paraphrased)---was a truthful 
statement, for which no rebuttal was necessary, especially 
when no "restitution" was actually "recommended" against 
3 
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GARCIA. 
D. As noted in Part II of the Reply Argument section 
below, the State's characterization [page 5, line 14 and 
following] of the "initial hearing" discussion concerning 
the $7, ooo is distorted and misleading. See Part II of 
Appellant's Reply Argument discussion. 
E. The October 2011 "letter", written by the Board's 
Senior Hearing Officer in specific response to GARCIA' s 
familymembers' letter concerning "restitution", is correctly 
quoted [page 6 of BRIEF OF APPELLEE] but for a misleading 
and incorrect conclusion. IF---the "big IF"---the Board had 
"ordered" GARCIA to make "restitution" a year earlier, the 
"letter" would have clearly said so, rather than the "thank 
you for bringing this to our attention" (paraphrased) 
together with the futuristic actions for the Board and the 
Crime Victims Reparations agency. Defendant made no payments 
against the claimed "restitution" amount, as his bi-weekly 
"NORMS statements" issued to the prison inmates showed---
consistently for a five-year period, consisting of 
approximately 120 separately issued pieces of paper given to 
the inmate- - -a 11 $0. 00 restitution balance" owing for GARCIA. 
See RECORD at 383-386. [Four of NORMS statements---two at 
the beginning of GARCIA'S incarceration and two at the end 
thereof---were included as EXHIBIT 7 to the Board's 
Memorandum of Law in opposition to Defendant's "new trial" 
motion. J 
F. The State' s characterization [p. 6 J of the Board's 
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"order" (purportedly arising from the October 2010) is 
misleading when not distinguished from the "ORDER OF 
RESTITUTION", actually "made" (statutory term) 24 September 
2013 and filed with the District Court. 
G. The State's characterization (i.e. "Not until his 
sentence expired and the Board requested the Third District 
Court to enter the order on its docket as a civil judgment, 
R. 194-95, did defendant attempt to challenge it." Page 6, 
line 11) is similarly misleading. The words "the order", 
ostensibly referring to the Board's October 2010 decision, 
is not the "ORDER OF RESTITUTION" actually "made" and filed 
with the District Court. The "ORDER OF RESTITUTION" was not 
"requested" to be entered; in that narrow setting, the Board 
was compliant with the underlying statute. Defendant---on 8 
November 2013: a mere 29 days after entry of the "civil 
judgment" (State's terminology: page 6, line 12)---
thereafter filed his "set aside" motion. RECORD at 122-148. 
H. The State asserts that the Board's "amended order", 
asserted to be made "three days later" (which would have 
been October 10, 2010, but which was actually six days 
later: October 13th) made "no substantive changes" to the 
earlier order. Incorrect, as can be verified by a comparison 
thereof. See RECORD at Pages 188 and 190. The "corrected" 
document (13 October 2010, entitled "HEARING OFFICER 
RESULTS") does not specifically identify the $7,000 amount, 
which the "INITIAL HEARING" document did; the "corrected" 
document certainly wouldn't facially stand to be a 
5 
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"restitution order". 
I. The State asserts [page 8, footnote] that the Utah 
Supreme Court's Laycock decision was rendered before the 
Restitution Act statute [77-38a-101 et seq] contained the 
"within one year after sentencing" requirement. The State is 
incorrect. The "within one year after sentencing" 
requirement was adopted by the Legislature in 200s , pursuant 
to Senate Bill 94 "Restitution Amendments", and was 
effective in May 2005. Laycock was issued in 2009. 
The enumeration of the foregoing "corrections" to the 
State's "factual" assertions should not be construed as the 
complete listing of the State's errors; there are numerous 
other errors of lesser substantive significance which are 
not herein identified. 
APPELLANT'S CLARIFICATION OF THE PARTIES AND ISSUES 
"ON APPEAL" 
A. Parties "on appeal" 
The State intentionally mischaracterizes the "parties" 
to this appeal in failing to designate the UTAH BOARD OF 
PARDONS AND PAROLE [hereinafter "the Board"] and the UTAH 
OFFICE OF DEBT COLLECTION---each of whom affirmatively 
petitioned (on 13 January 2014) the District Court "for 
voluntary intervention" into the case as claimed "real 
parties-in-interest") through their assigned counsel 
(Assistant Attorney General Sharel s Reber for the Board and 
Assistant Attorney General Amanda Jex for Debt Collection). 
The two Assistant Attorneys General filed---separately, on 
6 
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occasion, for their distinct 11 clients 11 ---voluminous 
materials in the case, beginning in February 2014. In 
contrast, the "State of Utah 11 ---acting ostensibly through 
and represented by the Salt Lake County District Attorney- - -
as II Plaintiff II in the case made no response and made no 
arguments nor submitted any materials. 
If now---as the BRIEF OF APPELLEE facially implies---
that the "State of Utah" is the singular 11 appellee" in the 
appeal, then the Court should disregard the entirety of the 
State's arguments which are thus raised by it (the State) 
"for the first time on appeal". 
Issues "on appeal" 
The State asserts [page 2 of its BRIEF OF APPELLEE] 
that only the "no jurisdiction'' issue is before the Court 
11 on appeal 11 • Incorrect. All appealed issues, properly 
"preserved" and identified within APPELLANT 1 S BRIEF, are 
before the Court of Appeals II on appeal" and should be 
decided substantively, regardless of the District Court's 
refusal to rule thereon and the State 1 s intentional, 
tactical decision in failing to "brief II any rebuttal or 
discussion thereto. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY ARGUMENT 
I 
THE DISTRICT COURT DOES HAVE "JURISDICTION" 
TO "SET ASIDE" THE "CIVIL JUDGMENT" ENTERED 
BY REASON OF THE FILING OF THE BOARD-PREPARED 
24 SEPTEMBER 2013 "ORDER OF RESTITUTION" 
In its misguided attempt to justify its patently 
7 
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improper "restitution order", the State confuses the issue 
by failing to recognize the obvious distinction between 
Court-ordered "restitution" as part of the criminal 
sentencing process (as identified in the Restitution Act, 
Section 77-38a-101 et seq) and Board-ordered "restitution" 
identified and authorized by Section 77-27-6(4), including 
the District Court's "civil judgment" role therein. The 
State utilizes terminology [page 7, line SJ such as 
"reopening the criminal case for substantive challenges", 
which merely confirms the State's conceptual 
misunderstanding as how this all works. The Court should not 
fall into the same "trap". 
The provisions of Subsection 77-27-6(4) are---as the 
State acknowledges [page 2, last line: State's term is 
"determinative"]---controlling and dispositive. The 
provisions of Section 77-38a-302(5) (d)---establishing the 
"within one year after sentencing" requirement for Court-
ordered restitution as part of the criminal sentencing 
process---are fundamentally inapplicable to Board-ordered 
"res ti tut ion II and the District Court's "civil judgment" role 
therein. 
Quietly buried past the mid-point of its "lost 
jurisdiction" argument, the State acknowledges [p. 9, line 
6 of its BRIEF OF APPELLEE] that 
11 
••• Utah's district courts possess jurisdiction 
over all civil and criminal matters not excluded 
by Utah constitution or prohibited by law ... 11 
As authority for this statement, the State references to 
8 
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Section 78A-5-102, Utah Code. Section 78A-5-102---which is 
but one of many statutory and constitutional provisions 
cited in APPELLANT'S BRIEF and which numerous provisions 
will not be recited here---provides in relevant part: 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction 
in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in 
the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law. 
Emphasis added. This statute [78A-5-102 (1)] is not the 
initial "starting place" for "jurisdiction"; Article VIII, 
Section 5 of the Utah Constitution is, by providing in 
relevant part: 
The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by 
this constitution or by statute, 
The State's "no jurisdiction" (or "jurisdiction has been 
divested") argument is not based---to the understanding of 
Appellant GARCIA'S undersigned 
"constitutional" argument. Thus, 
counsel---upon 
at least 
a 
for 
"constitutional" analysis, the District Court's "original 
jurisdiction in all matters" (emphasis added) must be 
11 limited by statute". 
Section 78A-5-102(1), adopted pursuant Section 5 of 
Article VIII, utilizes slightly different language: to the 
phrase "in all matters" is added the qualifying "civil and 
criminal" as well as the wording "prohibited by law" 
{statute) is substituted for the phrase "limited . by 
statute" {constitution). 
Rather than deserving the State's casual, in passing 
9 
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mention, Section 78A-5-102 ought to be the "starting point" 
for any analysis of the District Court's "jurisdiction". 
Section 78A-5-102(1) expressly recognizes, if not actually 
grants, the District Court's "original jurisdiction in all 
matters civil and criminal ... "; the phrase "jurisdiction 
in all matters civil and criminal" certainly must include 
the "jurisdiction" to "enter" the "civil judgment" arising 
from the filing of the Board-prepared "restitution order", 
filed with the District Court in apparent compliance with 
Section 77-27-6 (4) . 
The State follows its assertion (of "lost jurisdiction" 
page 7] admission by persisting in claiming "that 
jurisdiction has been lost- - -as has happened here" [page 9, 
line 8], so that the court "may nevertheless lack the 
authority to proceed" [page 9, line 9]. Emphasis added. Note 
the State's usage of the word "authority" when we ought to 
be talking about 11 jurisdiction 11 ; although the terms 
"jurisdiction" and "authority" might be considered to be 
conceptually synonymous, the State's usage of the word 
"authority" does tend to confuse the issue. The State's 
statement ("lacks the authority to proceed") is absurd. 
Either the District Court has "jurisdiction" or it doesn't. 
The State bases its "lost jurisdiction" argument upon 
this Court's decision in the case of State vs Montoya, 825 
P.2d 676 (Utah Court of Appeals 1991), and the provisions of 
the Restitution Act [Subsection 77-38a-302 (5) (d) J, 
pertaining to "within one year of sentencing". 
10 
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Montoya is relied upon as "authority" for State's 
assertions by reason of a for a single sentence contained 
therein, paraphrased thus: "Upon sentencing, the court loses 
jurisdiction. 11 No additional explanation of Montoya is 
advanced. 
The State's reference to the statute [Restitution Act, 
Subsection 7 7 - 3 8 a - 3 O 2 ( 5 ) ( d) [ "within one year after 
sentencing"] totally eviscerates the Montoya-based "loses 
jurisdiction" argument. The statute expressly recognizes the 
District Court' s II jurisdiction" - - -to II order" res ti tut ion as 
part of its sentencing powers over the criminal defendant---
to extend past sentencing. Either Montoya doesn't mean---at 
least in this narrow context- - -what the State says the 
decision means, or the Legislature has ignored the quoted 
verbiage with the result that the District Court does have 
post-sentencing "jurisdiction". 
Subsection 77-38a-302(5) (d) of the Restitution Act---
the so-called "within one year after sentencing" provision--
-has absolutely no bearing on the "jurisdictional" issue. 
The "within one year after sentencing" is a limitation upon 
the District Court's ability to "order" the imposition of 
"restitution" as part of its criminal sentence for a 
convicted defendant. 
Contrary to the State's argument (that 77-38a-302 (5) (d) 
is controlling or "determinative"), the provisions of 
Subsection 77-27-6 ( 4) - - -THE precise statute which authorizes 
the Board to file its "restitution order" with the District 
11 
STEPHEN G HOMER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
Court to create and acquire the specific "civil judgment" at 
issue in this case---are controlling. 
The State's interpretation would emasculate the 
provisions of Section 77-27-6(4): the very statute upon 
which it must rely to obtain the "civil judgment". Such an 
absurd result cannot be condoned. 
The starting point for the District Court's 
"jurisdiction" is the statutes and constitutional provisions 
previously cited. Those provisions are supplemented further 
by the provisions of STATUTE under which this specific 
11 appeal" ( ala District Court entry of a "civil judgment II by 
reason of the Board-ordered "restitution") is before the 
court, namely Section 77-27-6(4). Indeed, the State 
affirmatively characterizes [page 2 of its BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE] Subsection 77-27-6 (4) to be "determinative". 
Subsection 77-27-6(4) provides in its entirety (not merely 
the last sentence thereof, as quoted by the State in other 
portions of its BRIEF): 
(4) If the defendant, upon termination or 
expiration of the sentence owes outstanding fines, 
restitution, or other assessed costs, or if the 
board makes an order of restitution within 60 days 
after termination or expiration of sentence, the 
matter shall be referred to the district court for 
civil collection remedies. The Board of Pardons 
and Parole shall forward a restitution order to 
the sentencing court to be entered on the judgment 
docket. The entry shall constite a lien and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money 
in a civil judgment. 
Emphasis added. 
It is unfortunate that the legislatively-chosen word 
12 
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11 lien 11 is somewhat problematic (but not fatally 
dispositive), as there is---in the described situation---no 
11 res" (undersigned's terminology) against which the 11 lien 11 
would attach and become "enforceable". See, for example, 
statutory "mechanic's lien II against real property (for 
improvements or repairs) or personal property (auto 
repairs), lessor's lien (against personal property kept on 
rented or leased premises), "hospital liens" (for insurance 
company payments perhaps made directly to patient), and 
11 attorney's lien" for portions of received settlements or 
awards. That the intention of the statute (77-27-6 (4)] is to 
create a "civil judgment" (statutory term and utilized by 
the undersigned to describe the essence of what was intended 
and has actually happened), is recognized by all. The State 
has even initiated collection activities (i.e. 11 demand 
letters" to Defendant and his counsel to pay the judgment) 
thereon. 
In compliance with the provisions of Subsection 77-27-
6 (4) ---but not necessarily in compliance with 77-27-6 (2) (c) 
[ 11 ••• board shall make all orders of restitution within 60 
days after the termination or expiration of the defendant's 
sentence"] or with Section 77-27-5 (1) (c) ["No restitution 
may be ordered ... except after a full hearing ... ] and 
other statutes identified herein- - -the Board "forwarded" its 
24 September 2013 "ORDER OF RESTITUTION to the District 
Court. RECORD at 119. 
It was this "ORDER OF RESTITUTION", filed and entered 
13 
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about 10 October 2013, which the Defendant GARCIA promptly 
[8 November 2013: 29 days following its entry] sought to set 
aside. [The State is seemingly critical of the timing (or 
claimed lateness) of Defendant's challenge. Such is 
disingenuous. Until the Board filed its "restitution order", 
there was nothing to challenge.] The Board made no attempt 
to "file" with the District Court either of the two October 
2010 Parole Board documents ["INITIAL HEARING" and "HEARING 
OFFICER RESULTS"] as a "restitution order". 
There is nothing within the expressed provisions of 
Subsection 77-27-6(4) which indicates a legislative intent 
that the District Court has somehow been "divested" of 
"jurisdiction", most specifically "jurisdiction" to "set 
aside" the resultant "civil judgment" the court has 
previously 
statute. 
"entered" against the Defendant, as per the 
The State makes no attempt to frame, analyze or respond 
to this issue. The State simplistically cites to Montoya 
(for authority for its "loses jurisdiction" claim) and the 
Restitution Act (which implicitly if not explicitly 
undermines the "loses jurisdiction" statement of Montoya). 
The Restitution Act itself is generally inapplicable to the 
situation-at-hand, as this case simply does not involve 
"restitution", "court-ordered" as part of the sentencing 
process. 
There is nothing in the State's argument which 
indicates or supports a claim of legislative intention to 
14 
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"divest" the District Court of "jurisdiction". On the 
contrary, the statute [77-27-6(4)] is quite explicit in its 
terminology: 
1. The second sentence thereof states "The Board 
of Pardons and Parole shall forward a restitution 
order to the sentencing court to be entered on the 
judgment docket." Emphasis added. 
2. The third sentence is even more explicit, by 
providing: "The entry shall constitute a lien and 
is subject to the same rules as a judgment for 
money in a civil judgment." Emphasis added. 
Obviously, the Legislature thought the District Court had 
"jurisdiction" enough to "enter" the equivalent of a "civil 
judgment". Indeed, the Board's own "ORDER OF RESTITUTION" 
facially recognizes this concept, by stating (even in bold-
face type distinguishable from other parts thereof): 
When entered on the Courts Docket, this Order 
shall constitute a lien against the Defendant and 
its subject to the Rules that apply in any Civil 
Judgment. 
Emphasis added. RECORD at 119. 
The State's arguments premised upon the "within one 
year after sentencing" provision [within the Restitution 
Statute, applicable to the sentencing court imposing 
restitution as part of the criminal sentence] are unavailing 
in this situation. 
Assuming---only for the sake of argument---the 
fundamental functionality of the State's "lost (or 
"divested") jurisdiction" argument, the Legislature must 
nevertheless be deemed to have rejected the substantive 
concepts upon which the argument is based. In enacting 
15 
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Subsection 77-27-6 (4), the Legislature either (1) implicitly 
granted to the District Court the necessary "jurisdiction" 
to "enter" the "civil judgment" based upon the filing of the 
Board-prepared "restitution order", or (2) expressly 
recognized previously- existing "jurisdiction" which the 
District Court never "lost" (as the State claims). 
In enacting Subsection 77-27-6(4), the Legislature was 
aware that the statute's provisions would be applicable only 
in situations involving Board-ordered 
11 restitution".FOOTNOTE1 The Legislature was further aware 
that Board would have its "jurisdiction" (to order 
"restitution")---albeit arguably only after expiration of 
the "within one year" rule---pursuant to Subsection 77-27-
6 (2), which expressly "ties in into" Subsection 77-38a-
302 (5) (d) (ii) of the Restitution Act. [ In fact, the 
provisions of 77-27-6 (4) are controlling, even without 
regard to the "within one year" rule, were the Board to act 
in apparent conflict with the implied time-restrictions of 
the 11 rule 11 .] 
That the Legislature was aware that ••sentencing" was 
complete is evidenced not only by the "history" of any given 
"case" (for Board-ordered "restitution"), but also by the 
express statutory directive followed in this very case, as 
described in the second sentence Subsection 77-27-6(4): 
1 Section 77-27-6, as well as other "restitution" 
statutes, were simultaneously "amended 11 pursuant to Senate ~ 
Bill 94, passed by the 2005 Legislature. See later discussion 
beginning at page 21, herein. 
16 
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The Board of Pardons and Parole shall forward a 
restitution order to the sentencing court to be 
entered on the judgment docket. 
Emphasis added. In light of the 11 to the sentencing court" 
text, the State's contrived "lost jurisdiction" argument has 
been either ignored or rejected by the Legislature. Were the 
State's "lost jurisdiction" argument to be followed, the 
District Court would have had no "jurisdiction" to 11 enter 11 
the sought-for "civil judgment". The Legislature has 
recognized the District Court's "jurisdiction" to deal in 
this matter; so should the Court of Appeals. 
The Legislature has expressly stated its intention that 
there was certainly enough "jurisdiction" to "enter" the 
"civil judgment". That intention also identified 
"jurisdiction" for court action and proceedings "subject to 
the same rules as a money judgment in a civil judgment". 
Emphasis added. Those proceedings---by way of illustration 
only and not by way of limitation- - -might be "garnishments" 
or "executions 11 , so as to make the II civil judgment 11 
meaningful and enforceable. 
Except for recognizing [p. 9 of BRIEF OF APPELLEE] the 
district court's "jurisdiction II under a single statute [i.e. 
Section 78A-5-102] of the several statutes and 
constitutional provisions pertaining to district court 
"jurisdiction" identified and analyzed in APPELLANT'S BRIEF, 
the State has made no attempt to rebut or even analyze the 
inapplicability of those numerous provisions and/or to find 
fault with Defendant's analysis thereof. Likewise, the State 
17 
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has made no effort to show how the "divested" argument works 
against the express grants of 11 jurisdiction 11 pursuant to the 
referenced statutes. The State's superficial effort---in the 
face of Appellant's obvious showing---can be neither 
countenanced nor rewarded. 
The foregoing having been observed and said, there is 
no indication that the Legislature-recognized "jurisdiction" 
somehow vanishes and disappears, immediately after the 
"entry" of the resultant "civil judgment", never again to 
reappear or be exercised. Such an absurd result is, however, 
the essence and result of the State's illogical, 
unsupported, fanciful argument and its conclusions. 
Additionally, there is a certain "estoppel II argument in 
opposition to the State's "lost jurisdiction" argument, 
arising from the Board's actions which brought all of this 
about: the State (or the Board) cannot actively seek and 
obtain the 11 civil judgment" against Defendant GARCIA, thus 
implicitly recognizing there was II jurisdiction" for the 
District Court to enter the same, but simultaneously claim 
that moments later the "jurisdiction" somehow vanishes, 
never again to be utilized. 
Likewise, the Board's "no jurisdiction" argument rings 
very hollow and illusory, given the Board's own "restitution 
order"---THE "restitution order" which was actually "filed" 
and which started this whole "case" - - -was not facially 
compliant with controlling statute: namely, Subsection 77-
27-6(2) (c) [". . the board shall make all orders of 
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restitution within 60 days after termination or expiration 
of the defendant's sentence." Emphasis added.], which was 
GARCIA' s original claim to "set aside" the "civil judgment". 
[The Board had argued the October 2010 "INITIAL HEARING" and 
"HEARING OFFICER RESULTS" were "restitution orders". If they 
were, why were not such "orders" filed with the District 
Court? If they were, why was there a need to create (i.e. 
"make") and thereafter file the 24 September 2013 "ORDER OF 
RESTITUTION? The statute says "shall make all orders. 
within 60 days. " The word "shall" is binding and 
mandatory, not permissive. The word 11 all 11 means ALL, no 
exceptions; especially for THE "restitution order" intended 
to have legal effect by reason of its "filing" with the 
"sentencing court".] 
The District Court's "jurisdiction" - - -even pre-existing 
jurisdiction---to enter a "civil judgment" ought not be 
validly invoked except in strict compliance with the 
relevant statutes. Similarly, that any Board action 
purporting to order "restitution" in this case would be an 
"ultra vires" act---with the same result---because the 
State's claim for II funeral expenses" was time-barred by the 
78B-2-304(2) 2-year statute of limitation. 
B 
The decision of the Utah Supreme Court in the case of 
The State of Utah vs Claudia Laycock, District Judge, 2009 
UT 53, 214 P.3d 104 (Utah Supreme Court 2009) was originally 
raised (at the 24 March 2014 oral argument hearing but not 
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in her written brief submitted the month earlier) by 
Intervenor and "real-party-in-interest" State Office of Debt 
Collection through its counsel Assistant Attorney General 
Amanda Jex). Her stated principal purpose in citing Laycock 
was that the signed "RELEASE" (June 2008) would and should 
have no effect upon the District Court's determination of 
11 complete restitution". [At that juncture, that was not what 
the District Court was doing: we are here talking about 
Board-ordered restitution.] While such may have been the 
"theoretical" underpinning of things, the Supreme Court's 
closing comments of its decision---that the RELEASE would be 
effective to bar the widow's claims if enforcement of the 
criminal court's "civil judgment" were attempted---renders 
Laycock very significant. In this regard, Mrs Buckley's 
signed "Release" would, could and should have significance 
against the State's claims, which are now being enforced. 
[Assistant AG Jex also argued that Laycock was authority 
that GARCIA'S "set aside" claims against the Board's 
"restitution order" must be filed only pursuant to the 
"extraordinary writ" provisions of Rule 65B.] 
Laycock involved a fact situation quite similar to 
GARCIA' s: death-involved driving offense, civil litigation, 
and settlement. The offense was committed and the defendant 
therein was sentenced in 2004, but the district court did 
not get around to determining "restitution" until 2007. The 
district court refused to determine "complete restitution", 
and the State---unable to "appeal" from a criminal verdict--
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- filed for "extraordinary relief" under Rule 6 SB in an 
original proceeding in the Utah Supreme Court. The Laycock 
decision---the Supreme Court's "taken" opportunity for a 
"teaching moment" for all criminal court judges statewide---
was finally issued in 2009. 
The State states [Footnote 2 on page 8 of BRIEF] the 
District Court's rejection of GARCIA' s claimed (by the State 
and by the District Court, but in error) "reliance" on 
Laycock, ostensibly on the basis that the "restitution Act" 
statute did not contain the "within one year after 
sentencing" when the Laycock decision was rendered. The 
State cites to pages 595 and 606 of the RECORD as the 
District Court's duplicative statement. The State and the 
District Court are both in error. The "within one year of 
sentencing" was added by the 2005 Legislature, pursuant to 
Senate Bill 94, which became effective in May 2005---after 
the defendant in the criminal case had been sentenced [in 
2004 in that case], but considerably before the Utah Supreme 
Court decided Laycock [in 2009]. [The 2005 legislation not 
only adopted the "within one year after sentencing" 
standard, but also adopted the "Board shall make all orders 
of restitution within 60 days after termination or 
expiration of sentence" text contained in Subsection 77-27-
6 (4) (2) (c) as well as that essentially verbatim text 
contained in Subsection 77-27- 6 (4) . These material 
provisions, adopted pursuant to the same legislative 
"amendment" enacted in 2005, should not be construed in a 
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manner to create conflict within themselves.] 
The significance of Laycock, however, is not in its 
approved "timing" of things. Rather, Laycock---recognizing 
if not mandating Court-ordered "restitution" extending 
presumptively three years [2004 to 2007] and/or five years 
[2004 to 2009 or later] after conviction---totally 
emasculates the "lost jurisdiction" arguments claimed to 
arise under Montoya, even in the absence of the "within one 
year after sentencing" statutory text. 
C 
The State argues the District Court has no 
"jurisdiction" to "go behind" the Board's filed "restitution 
order". The statutory invalidity is obvious from the face of 
the document itself. Attributing a "personal" knowledge to 
Judge Skanchy (had the Board-prepared "ORDER OF RESTITUTION" 
of 24 September 2013 been first presented to him in lieu of 
the "automatic" entry thereof), the following issues would 
have been facially obvious: 
1. The 24 September 2013- "made 11 ( statutory term) was 
statutorily defective, as being "late", as not being 
"made within 60 days of expiration of sentence". [Judge 
Skanchy would have known Defendant GARCIA was sentenced 
to a "five year" sentence of incarceration, commencing 
mid-April 2008. The Board-prepared ORDER OF RESTITUTION 
was facially "late".] 
2. Any Board-prepared and -filed "restitution 
order" for "funeral expenses" would be an "ultra 
vires" act (by the Board), as 2-year "statute of 
limitation" (as per Section 78B-2-304 (2), Utah 
Code) had expired (in March 2008), even prior to 
Defendant's June 2008 sentencing, at which time 
the Parole Board first acquired "jurisdiction" 
over the Defendant. Thus, the Board-prepared ORDER 
OF RESTITUTION was facially invalid, as the Board 
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had not authority to enter the order.] 
In addition to the "facial" invalidities of the Board's 
"filed" ORDER OF RESTITUTION, there are a number of related 
"facts" (and, specifically, non-events critical and 
dispositive for "statute of limitation" reasons) of which 
the District Court was II institutionally" aware, as of 
October 2013 when the Board's ORDER was presented for filing 
and "civil judgment": 
3. Mrs Gail Buckley, as "personal representative 11 
of the Estate of Shane Buckley, Deceased and in 
her own name timely-filed (in February 2008) her 
own "wrongful death" lawsuit against Defendant 
Dennis J Garcia, in which she claimed inter alia 
damages for "funeral expenses". 
4. The "Buckley wrongful death" lawsuit 
identified only Mrs Buckley as a plaintiff and did 
not identify nor include the State Off ice for 
Victims of Crime as a party nor mention any 
payment made to her. 
5. The II Buckley wrongful death" lawsuit, 
responded to (ala formally "answered") by GARCIA 
through counsel, was "dismissed" in August 2008, 
pursuant to joint motion of the parties, 
implicitly indicating a "settlement". 
6. The State Office for Victims of Crime (or its 
successor agency) filed no "wrongful death" claim, 
at any time, against GARCIA, under a "subrogation" 
theory, for "funeral expenses". 
That the State (and/or the Board, through Appellee's 
appellate counsel) argues that the District Court has "no 
jurisdiction" to look "behind" the Board's "ORDER" is, for 
essentially the same reasons and constitutional "logic", why 
the "no judicial review of Board decisions" statute [77-27-
5 (3), Utah Code] is unconstitutional, as violative of the 
"open courts" provision of Article I, Section 11 of the Utah 
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Constitution. The District Court, as a matter of law, does 
have "jurisdiction" to look "behind" the filed ORDER to 
ascertain the underlying validity of the "order" and its 
resulting "civil judgment". 
The controlling statute [77-27-6 (4)] expressly 
recognizes the District Court's 11 jurisdiction 11 ---even "pre-
existing jurisdiction"---to "enter" the "civil judgment". 
The statute states: 
The entry [of the Board's restitution order] shall 
constitute a lien and is subject to the same rules 
as a judgment for money in a civil judgment. 
Emphasis added. Bracketed text added for clarity. The 
highlighted text confirms the applicability of the Rules [of 
Civil Procedure] to the situation. Arguably, most of the 
"rules" would be applicable. While not expressly stated, the 
rules pertaining to a ''money judgment"---i.e. those rules 
pertaining to "attachment" [Rule 64B], "garnishment" [Rule 
64D] and "execution 11 [Rule 64E] , as well as "supplemental 
proceedings" so as to identify the debtor's assets to be 
subject to garnishment, attachment or execution. 
Presumptively, 
"jurisdiction" to 
the 
hear 
District Court would have 
defendant-initiated matters 
concerning the amount of accruing II interest" as well as 
claims that the "judgment" may have been "paid" or is 
somehow barred by passage of time beyond 8 years after entry 
and/or may be barred by a discharge in bankruptcy or 
mitigated by "accord and satisfaction" principles. 
It is amazing that for all of those "examples" of post-
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sentencing involvement "jurisdiction" exists to enforce 
and/or aid in the collection of the "civil judgment" so 
created and entered; nevertheless the State persists to 
argue there is no "jurisdiction" for the District Court to 
"set aside" that same "judgment". 
The Court of Appeals should not mistakenly succumb to 
the State's misguided arguments. 
D 
The State argues [page 9, line 5] that the District 
Court would have "jurisdiction under Rule 65B, which 
empowers that court to consider [Garcia's] substantive 
claims. 11 Bracketed word substituted for clarity. Rule 65B 
does not grant "jurisdiction" to the District Court; Rule 
65B merely identifies a specialized remedy available in 
specialized circumstances [i.e. "Where no other plain, 
speedy and adequate remedy is available, a person may 
petition the court for extraordinary relief . " Rule 
65B (a)] wherein the Court might otherwise already have 
"jurisdiction". 
If there is "jurisdiction" for the District Court to 
act in response to a petition filed seeking Rule 65B relief 
and remedy, there is "jurisdiction" for the District Court 
to act to "set aside" the "civil judgment" under Rule 60 (b). 
That the Defendant was no longer in the custody (or 
"jurisdiction") of the Board of Pardons is further 
problematic for everyone. Likewise, it is the District Court 
"civil judgment" which is ultimately at issue. GARCIA's 
25 
STEPHEN G HOMER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
timely, specific Rule 60 (b) 11 set aside" motion, in a case in 
which the Board and the other 11 real-party-in-interest 11 have 
intervened, is sufficient to do what is necessary. 
II 
THE 5 OCTOBER 2010 "INITIAL HEARING" 
WAS NOT THE STATUTORILY-REQUIRED "FULL HEARING" 
AS A NECESSARY PREREQUISITE TO BOARD-ORDERED RESTITUTION 
While not expressly framing a responsive "argument" on 
this issue, the State goes to great lengths within its 
"statement of relevant facts" [page 5 of its BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE] to seemingly claim and argue that the 5 October 
2010 "initial hearing" was the statutorily-required "full 
hearing" identified and argued by GARCIA. As shown below, 
the State's brief description of the "hearing" as well as 
the State's quotation of GARCIA'S "I think we've covered it" 
remark is misleading and, for that reason, patently false. 
During the entirety of the proceedings before the 
District Court, the Board submitted no documentation to even 
hint that "restitution" was "on-the-table" for consideration 
(of imposition against GARCIA) at the October 2010 hearing. 
The concept of any "restitution" was brought up---and then 
only at end, and then only in passing. During the entire 
hearing, the word "restitution" was mentioned but a single 
time. 
As an "exhibit" attached to its "opposition" memorandum 
of law filed in February 2014, the Board submitted the 7-
page "transcript" of the October 2010 11 hearing 11 ---the so-
called "initial hearing" generally afforded all prisoners 
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under Board "jurisdiction" at the State Prison. See RECORD 
at 180-186. Pages 6 and 7---which are attached as ADDENDUM 
1 to this APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF---are quoted, thus (with 
hand-written annotation by the undersigned): 
HEARING OFFICER: ... that, what do you want to 
do with the rest of your time? 
GARCIA: People have been know to stay there. Um, 
I did get satisfaction from helping others that 
are struggling like I was when I got there, but at 
the same time, I feel like I'm at the peak of my 
recovery and I've worked too hard to lose anything 
I've gained from that program, so going somewhere 
else might not be a bad option. I was thinking 
Lone Peak to kind of a maybe get me ready as far 
as work and ah, stuff like that. 
HEARING OFFICER: Okay. Ah, um, I'm sure the 
possibility as crossed your mind that you might do 
all five years for this, what the legal 
consideration is that you, you were reckless and 
careless and so that's why you were sentenced the 
way you were, you didn't get Manslaughter which 
carries a one to fifteen year sentence and I think 
you were probably appropriately sentenced, but I 
think the Board will consider the possibility of 
having you do all five years. What I do is make a 
recommendation and I'm not sure what that's going 
to be so I'm going to take your case under 
advisement today, ah, and I just that um, to maybe 
just prepare your mind, um, for that possibility, 
but I'm sure they will also consider the 
possibility of paroling you at some point too, 
you're about half way through with your sentence 
so there still remains the possibility that 
they'll let you out some time in the next thirty 
months and have you serve the remainder of your 
time on parole. If they were to do that, I'm sure 
they would order you to continue in some kind of 
substance abuse aftercare and have interlocking 
device on your vehicle, pay restitution, I know 
there's seven thousand dollars was paid by a state 
agency for the funeral costs, and of course no 
alcohol. Um, so when you get out of here, whether 
that' s on parole or having [page break here] 
served all five years, what do you plan to do? 
GARCIA: Well, my plans (inaudible) I plan to seek 
further education. My parents are deaf, I know 
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sign language. There is a course out there 
designed kinda for people like me that knows sign 
language that need advanced training to get 
certified. I was thinking about pursuing that. I 
also have a couple other options that I could 
probably pretty much jump right into. I do want to 
take advantage of resources that are out there for 
me to get an education to help me out with the 
certification. 
HEARING OFFICER: Okay. Alright, is there anything 
else you'd like to talk about? 
GARCIA: Not that I could think of, I think we've 
covered it. 
HEARING OFFICER: Okay, well I've kind of 
explained the way the process works. I'll finish 
writing a report. I'll come to a recommendation 
that I'll give that report along with your whole 
file to the five member Board. They make the final 
decision and that normally takes two or three 
weeks, okay? 
GARCIA: Okay. 
HEARING OFFICER: Alright, I wish you well. 
GARCIA: Thank you very much. 
Emphasis added. RECORD at 185-186. ADDENDUM 1 hereto. 
As shown above, the singular reference to any 
"restitution" was in the conditional context of GARCIA'S 
being released "on parole". The Hearing Officer made 
absolutely no inquiry as to whether GARCIA had an objections 
or "defenses" thereto. 
The Hearing Officer made no indication that the Board 
would be considering "restitution" or that he would be 
"recommending" it. The Hearing Officer's statement 
containing the "restitution" remark consisted of at least 
four rambling, "run-on sentences" covering a wide range of 
topics and issues, for 250 words. The Hearing Officer's 
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question following the "restitution" remark was: 
HEARING OFFICER: ... Um, so when you get out of 
here, whether that's on parole or having served 
all five years, what do you plan to do? 
Hearing Transcript, pp. 6-7; RECORD at 185-186; ADDENDUM #1, 
hereto. 
The actual "word count" for the "initial hearing" is---
excluding the frequent "um" and similar sounds---is 1902 
words. The above-referenced "restitution" remark, together 
with the "$7,000 paid by the state agency" (paraphrased) 
statement of fact (or the Hearing Officer's stated awareness 
thereof), totals a mere 18 words: less than one percent of 
the "hearing". GARCIA was not asked about "restitution". 
Such is hardly the "full hearing" the statute [Section 77-
27-5 (1) (c)] requires "before" the Board may "order 
restitution". 
III 
ALL OTHER APPELLANT-IDENTIFIED AND PROPERLY "PRESERVED" 
ISSUES FOR APPEAL SHOULD BE AUTHORITATIVELY DECIDED 
BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN SPITE OF APPELLEES' 
INTENTIONAL FAILURE TO "BRIEF" AND RESPOND THERETO 
The Appellant's other identified issues within 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF, briefly summarized as: 
A. Board-ordered "restitution" for "pecuniary 
damages" ( of "funeral expenses" reimbursement) was 
"ultra vires" as barred by two-year statute of 
limitation of 78B-2-3 04 [Subsection 77-3 6a-102 ( 6) , 
Utah Code ("definition" of "pecuniary damages")] 
B. Board's prepared and filed "restitution order" 
was untimely, as not being "made" within the 
statutorily-prescribed time from of "within 60 
days of expiration of sentence" [Subsection 77-27-
6 (2) (c)]. 
C. Section 77-27-5(3), Utah Code ["no judicial 
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review of Board restitution decisions 11 
(paraphrased)] is unconstitutional, as violative 
of the "open courts" prescription of Article I, 
Section 11 of the Utah Constitution. 
were each properly and timely presented to the District 
Court and have been thus "preserved for appeal 11 • The issues 
should be decided authoritatively by the Utah Court of 
Appeals, notwithstanding the intentional refusal to do so by 
the District Court (whose "legal" decision would have been 
given no deference in any case) and the State's calculated, 
tactical decision to intentionally refrain from responding 
to such issues. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court, pursuant to constitutionally and 
statutorily-recognized "grants" of jurisdiction, has 
"jurisdiction" to not only enter the Board's "restitution 
order", but to set aside the resulting "civil judgment". The 
State's claim that Montoya (1991) and/or the provisions of 
Subsection 7 7 - 3 8 a - 3 O 2 ( 5 ) ( d) [pertaining to the II within one 
year after sentencing", which is expressly applicable to 
Court-ordered restitution undertaken at sentencing, as part 
of the criminal case] are inappropriate to deprive the 
District Court of the "jurisdiction" clearly granted and/or 
recognized by Subsection 77-27-6(4). 
The Board consistently claimed in the proceedings 
before the District Court that "no restitution hearing was 
held", supposedly because (1) the Defendant had "waived the 
hearing" by failing to object to the pre-sentence report 
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statement, and/or (2) the Defendant had failed to "ask for" 
the hearing. On appeal, the State actively "switches horses" 
by abandoning the Board's acknowledgement that ("no 
restitution hearing was held") and asserting that the 
October 2010 "initial hearing" was, in fact and law, the 
statutorily-required "full hearing". An examination of the 
relevant oral discussion, as contained in the Board-provided 
11 wri tten transcript II of that "initial hearing" evidences the 
patent falsity of the State's claim. Coupled with the fact 
that there was no advance "notice" that "restitution" was 
going to be on-the-table for consideration and that the 
Board produced no documentary evidence of such advanced 
"notice 11 to GARCIA, the State's claims fail, as a matter of 
law. 
The Utah Court of Appeals should additionally decide 
the properly preserved other issues raised by Appellant 
GARCIA, notwithstanding the District Court's intentional 
refusal to rule on such issues and the State's appellate 
counsel's intentional and tactical choice in refraining to 
"brief" and/or otherwise respond thereto. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of June, 2015. 
/s/ Stephen G Homer 
STEPHEN G HOMER 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
DENNIS J GARCIA 
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GARCIA: 
HEARING OFFICER: 
that, what do you want to do with the rest of your time? 
People have been know to stay there. Um, I did get satisfaction 
from helping others that are struggling like I was when I got there, 
but at the same time, I feel like I'm at the peak of my recovery and 
I've worked too hard to lose anything I've gained from that 
program, so going somewhere else might not be a bad option. I 
was thinking Lone Peak to kind of a maybe get me ready as far as 
work and ah, stuff like that. 
. Okay. Ah, um, I'm sure the possibility has crossed your mind that 
you might do all five years for this, what the legal consideration is · 
is that you, you were reckless and careless and so that's why you 
were sentenced the way you were, you didn't get Manslaughter 
which carries a one to fifteen year sentence and I think you were 
probably appropriately sentenced, but I think the Board will 
consider the possibility of having you do all five years. What I do 
is I make a recommendation and I'm not sure what that's going to 
be so I'm going to take your case under advisement today, ah, and I 
just say that um, to maybe just prepare your mind um, for that 
possibility, but I'm sure they will also consider the possibility of 
paroling you at some point too, you're about half way through with 
your sentence so there still remains _that possibility too that they'll 
let you out some time in the next thirty months and have you serve 
the remainder of your time on parole. If they were to do that, I'm 
sure they would order you to continue in some kind of substance 
abuse aftercare and have an interlocking device on your vehicle, 
O~ \~ ~ pay restitution, I know there's seven thousand dollars was aid b a 
i¥J lC state agency for the funeral costs, and of course, no alcohol. Um, 
~ rt-Ssl-t~o when you get out of here, whether that's on parole or having 
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1 served all five years, what do you plan to do? Q ' 
2 GARCIA: Well, my plans (inaudible) I plan to seek further education. My 
3 parents are deaf, I know sign language. There is a course out there 
4 designed kinda for people like me that knows sign language that 
5 need advanced training to get certified. I was thinking about L 
6 pursuing that. I also have a couple other options that I could 
7 probably pretty much jump right into. I do want to take advantage 
8 of resources that are out there for me to get an education to help me Gt:, 
9 out with the certification. 
10 HEARING OFFICER: Okay. Alright, is there anything else you'd like to talk about? 
11 GARCIA: Not that I could think of, I think we've covered it. 
Cit)~ 
12 HEARING OFFICER: Okay, well I've kind of explained the way the process works. I'll 
13 finish writing a report. I'll come to a recommendation that I'll give 
14 that report along with your whole file to the five member Board. 
15 They make the final decision and that nonnally talces two to three ~ 
16 weeks, okay? 
17 GARCIA: Okay. 
18 HEARING OFFICER: Alright, I wish you well. 
'-1 
19 GARCIA: Thank you very much. 
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